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Access to treatment and the constitutional right to health in Germany: 
A triumph of hope over evidence? 
 
Abstract 
Health technology assessment is frequently credited with making difficult resource 
allocation decisions in health care fairer, more rational and more transparent.  In 
Germany, a constitutional ‘right to health’ allows patients to challenge decisions by 
sickness funds to withhold reimbursement of treatment excluded from public 
funding because of insufficient evidence of effectiveness.  The ability to litigate was 
qualified by the Constitutional Court in its 2005 ‘Nikolaus decision’ that sets out 
criteria to be applied to these cases. Treatment must be made available if (1) the 
condition is life-threatening, (2) no alternative treatment is available, and (3) there 
is an indication that the treatment could benefit the patient.  This paper examines 
how courts struggled to apply these criteria based on an analysis of cases of 
patients who sought treatment for cancer between 2005 and 2015, and explores 
the implications of applying a constitutional ‘right to life’ to treatment decisions.  
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Access to treatment and the constitutional right to health in Germany: 
A triumph of hope over evidence? 
 
Health technology assessment is frequently credited with making difficult resource 
allocation decisions in health care fairer, more rational and more transparent 
through the rigorous and systematic appraisal of scientific evidence (Banta 2003; 
Velasco Garrido et al. 2008).  Yet contrary to expectations, this has not reduced the 
potential for conflict and controversy, especially when treatment for life-
threatening illness is at stake (Syrett 2003; Timmins, Rawlins, and Appleby 2016).  
Politicians and administrations have been under sustained pressure to ensure 
access to novel treatment, often at high costs to society, as the rise and fall of the 
NHS Cancer Drug Fund in England demonstrates (Aggarwal et al. 2017).  In 
Germany, patients who are denied reimbursement by their sickness funds 
(Krankenkassen, also termed social health insurance funds in the international 
literature) are entitled by law to challenge these decisions in social courts.  In 2005, 
the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) strengthened the 
position of patients suffering from life-threatening illness vis-à-vis their sickness 
funds through the Nikolaus-Beschluss (so called after the day the decision was 
taken which was 6th of December, Saint Nicholas Day), which links access to 
treatment to the right to life enshrined in the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), the German 
constitution.  This ruling has become a powerful lever for patients to force sickness 
funds to fund treatment that has been excluded from reimbursement (Bohmeier 
and Penner 2009).  
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This paper argues that these court cases are the result of tensions between two 
norms that apply to access to treatment: the ‘right to health’ implied in the ‘right to 
life and physical integrity’ enshrined in Article 2 of the Constitution, and the 
principles of evidence-based medicine (EBM) that underpin the regulation of access 
to treatment. The first norm represents a social right that pertains to the individual 
citizen vis-a-vis the state. The second norm - extended to health technology 
assessment used in support of decisions on access to treatment - draws on 
principles of scientific rationalism and distributive justice that benefit society (here 
the society of sickness funds members) as a whole, if not necessarily all members 
equally or individually.  
The paper examines how courts in Germany struggle to reconcile these two norms, 
using a sample of court cases involved in access to treatment decisions relating to 
three types of cancer treatment: Avastin, Induced Hyperthermia, and 
Brachytherapy.  Access to cancer drugs and other forms of treatment of cancer is 
considered generous in Germany compared to other high-income countries. 
Between 2002 and 2014 all bar one new cancer drugs considered have received a 
favourable decision for reimbursement in Germany, in contrast to most other 
European countries (Maynou-Pujolras and Cairns 2015).  In part, this lenient 
approach reflects the reluctance of legislators to allow regulators to use cost-
effectiveness criteria as a decision-making tool.  It also shows the influence of ‘right 
to health’ jurisprudence on regulatory practice, which has raised the bar for 
exclusion.  Treatment options that were taken to court were therefore either 
proven to be not effective (i.e. high quality studies exist that demonstrate that the 
treatment is not effective) or evidence was inconclusive or insufficient (i.e. there 
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were not enough studies assessing effectiveness or existing studies were not 
sufficiently reliable or a combination of both).  
The following sections review the international debate about the role of litigation in 
access to treatment decisions, introduce the legal framework relevant to making 
such decisions in Germany, and outline the regulatory approach to access to health 
care decisions.  Then, the cases selected for this analysis are presented, followed by 
a discussion of the legal argumentation courts deployed when applying the criteria 
set out in the ‘Nikolaus decision’. The paper concludes with a discussion of the 
implications of this approach for both evidence use underpinning the regulatory 
approach and patients’ constitutional right to health.  
 
The role of courts in making decisions on access to health care 
The involvement of courts in access to health care decisions is widely debated 
internationally (Flood and Gross 2014; Kavanagh 2016; Syrett 2007; Wang 2015; 
Moes et al. 2016; Newdick 2009).  In low and middle income countries, a 
constitutional right to health can provide an important lever to improve access to 
health care and promote universal health coverage (Forman et al. 2016).  However, 
given the more limited resources of these countries, the right to health is largely 
seen as an aspirational, political project rather than an opportunity for individual 
law enforcement only.  The Constitutional Court of South Africa, for example, 
confirmed in a landmark decision in 1997 that a state-funded hospital acted 
lawfully when withholding renal dialysis from a terminally ill patient. The court 
accepted the reasoning of the hospital to prioritise patients who had some prospect 
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of improvement over those that did not arguing that the severe resource 
constraints in publicly funded care meant that there were many people whose 
medical needs could not be met (Soombraymoney versus Minister of Health 
(Kawazulu-Natal).  
However, in other jurisdictions the ‘right to health’ is interpreted in favour of 
patients despite the fact that resources are limited.  A study of access to health care 
cases in Brazil highlights some undesirable consequences of having relatively 
unrestricted opportunities to invoke a constitutional ‘right to health’ to challenge 
decisions of regulatory bodies to exclude health services that are proven to be 
insufficiently effective or cost-effective (Wang 2015).  Such excessive use of 
litigation can endanger the financial sustainability of public health care systems, 
especially those that already experience severe funding constraints (Wang 2015; 
Kuchenbecker and Planczyk 2012).  In Colombia, excessive litigation based on ‘right 
to health’ legislation has threatened the financial sustainability of publicly funded 
health care, with almost 3 million cases documented in little more than a decade 
(1999-2010) (Lamprea 2014).  Other concerns are that pharmaceutical 
manufacturers exploit the legal route to circumvent the regulator by encouraging 
patients to seek legal redress and that litigation disproportionately benefits 
wealthier patients (Afonso da Silva and Vargas Terrazas 2011).   
Others argue that courts are ill-equipped to adjudicate on access to care decisions, 
as they lack the expertise required to make such decisions “especially about the 
more technical matters involved in assessing efficacy and safety” (Daniels and 
Sabin, 2008: 59).  Yet others argue that courts can have an important role in 
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resolving health care related conflicts.  Morales notes that despite their lack of 
scientific expertise, judges are trained to act as “intelligent, objective observers” 
and are typically committed to consider all evidence without prejudicing the 
outcome (Morales, 2015: 190).  Syrett (2014) concludes that the argument that 
courts are not competent to deal with access to care cases is weak, but suggests 
that courts are not well placed to take allocative decisions.  In part, this is the result 
of the fact that courts do not have responsibility for health care budgets and lack 
oversight of the resource impact of their decisions.  More importantly, courts 
struggle to account for the ‘polycentric’ nature of allocative decisions that tend to 
affect members of populations (e.g. tax payers, members of sickness funds, current 
and future patients) unevenly; the impact of these decisions therefore differs 
structurally from cases that affect individuals only (Syrett 2014; Newdick 2009).  It is 
for this reason that decision-making requires democratic legitimation and should be 
taken by representatives of the affected body politic rather than by a small number 
of legal professionals.   
However, political decisions reflecting voter interests can unduly eclipse the 
interests and rights of individuals that find themselves not represented by the 
majority.  In Germany, there is sustained debate about the appropriate 
representation of patients in decision-making processes of the Federal Joint 
Committee (Gemeinsamer Bundesausschuss, GBA), the committee that determines 
health service coverage within the social health insurance system, which in the past 
only included representatives of doctors, hospitals and insurers (Gassner 2016).   
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Another strand of the debate concerns the contested boundary between ‘facts’ and 
‘values’ that can be brought to bear on access to care decisions.  It is now widely 
acknowledged that decisions on access to health care –discussed as prioritisation, 
rationing and rationalisation – speak to different concepts of justice and draw on 
different sets of social values (Rawlins 2012), which cannot easily be reconciled, if 
at all.  Should priority be given to the highest individual need or should we aim to 
maximise benefits more evenly across society (Cookson and Dolan 2000)?  As courts 
tend to focus on individual cases rather than collective problems of resource 
distribution, they are likely to prioritise individual need and in consequence are 
“liable to disrupt the inherently collective task of allocation of finite resources” 
(Syrett, 2010: 474).  
Internationally, courts have handled access to care cases very differently.  Syrett 
(2011) notes that courts in England tend to refrain from making substantive 
decisions on access to health care cases and focus on procedural justice only as 
there is no individual right to health or health care (given the absence of a written 
constitution).  This also reflects a legal tradition in which legal interventions in 
political decisions are rare, as individuals have few opportunities to contest 
decisions taken by Government or its agencies through the legal system.  In effect, 
courts have only questioned whether the National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence (NICE) uses appropriate procedures to arrive at its decisions and in the 
early years of the organisation demanded that NICE improved its appeals process to 
allow affected parties to challenge decisions.   
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In contrast, courts play a prominent role in German policy-making and citizens have 
a constitutional entitlement to take bodies of the public administration to court if 
they find that a decision infringes upon their constitutional rights (Landfried 1994).  
The idea of the ‘Rechtsstaat’ (the ‘constitutional state’, used as shorthand to signify 
the rule of law) is firmly anchored in Germany’s legal and political system, as well as 
the public psyche.  Surveys have shown substantial support of Germans for the role 
of the courts within the state, with the judiciary being more trusted than 
Government and Parliament (Patzelt, 2005).   
 
The legal framework regulating access to health care cases in Germany 
Cases concerning access to health care are typically decided by social courts, of 
which there is a hierarchy of 68 district social courts, 14 state social courts and the 
federal social court at the apex.  Access to social courts is free of charge for 
individuals in the first instance, meaning that the barriers to seeking legal redress 
are low.  Cases in which patients take sickness funds to court are decided at district 
level initially.  District court decisions can then be challenged before state social 
courts (Landessozialgerichte) and ultimately the federal social court 
(Bundessozialgericht).   
Social courts adjudicate on access to health care based on a body of social law that 
is set out in Social Code Book V (SGB 5).  SGB 5 spells out the responsibilities of 
sickness funds vis-à-vis their members (ca. 70 million, almost 80 percent of the 
population).  In particular, it states that sickness funds have to fund treatment 
requested by a patient and authorised by a physician qualified to provide services 
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within the statutory system, as long as these services are ‘necessary’, ‘adequate’, 
‘appropriate’ and ‘economical’ (notwendig, ausreichend, zweckmässig, 
wirtschaftlich) (SGB 5, article 12).  These legal terms are not well defined, but they 
broadly mean that the patient’s medical need cannot be met in other ways 
(necessary); that treatment has to be sufficient to meet this need (adequate); that 
is has to be effective (appropriate); and that it represents a good use of resources 
(economical or ‘value for money’, but not necessarily cost-effective).   
SGB 5 also lists a few exclusions (e.g. over-the-counter drugs) and explicitly includes 
alternative medicine (besondere Therapierichtungen), provided such services are 
‘adequate’ and ‘appropriate’ (i.e. there is some evidence of effectiveness).  SGB 5 
also sets out the expectations for quality and effectiveness (Wirksamkeit) noting 
that services should reflect a ‘generally accepted state of medical knowledge’ 
(allgemein anerkannter Stand medizinischen Wissens) and take account of ‘medical 
advances’ (medizinischer Fortschritt) (SGB 5, article 2).  In combination, these legal 
stipulations provide the framework that defines the scope of services funded by 
sickness funds, resulting in access to treatment being judged as generous compared 
to other (wealthy) countries (Busse and Blümel 2014).  
Within this framework, SGB 5 mandates the GBA to specify the catalogue of 
services available to sickness fund members.  To this end, the GBA uses health 
technology appraisals to inform decision on service inclusions or exclusions, guided 
by a detailed set of rules in its rules of procedure (GBA 2008) and involving a range 
of formats to review the evidence of effectiveness.  These reviews are typically 
conducted by the Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care (Institut für 
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Qualität und Wirtschaftlichkeit im Gesundheitswesen, IQWiG) on behalf of the GBA 
(with the exception of orphan drugs for the treatment of rare diseases that are 
undertaken by the GBA directly).  
However, different rules apply to different types of treatments and settings, 
specifically to service provided in hospital, provided in ambulatory settings, and to 
pharmaceuticals. These rules relate to both to the process of including or excluding 
services from reimbursement and to the type of evidence used in support of 
decisions. Recourse to scientific studies is limited to clinical effectiveness, with cost 
impacts only being explicitly considered for pharmaceuticals, although not in the 
form of cost-effectiveness.  In the hospital sector, all services are reimbursed by 
sickness funds unless the GBA has excluded them explicitly (Perleth, Gibis, and 
Goehlen 2009).  SGB 5 provides that hospital services can be excluded only if there 
is evidence that the treatment is ineffective or harmful; a lack of evidence of 
effectiveness is not sufficient.  In the ambulatory sector, in contrast, all services 
require approval by the GBA to be available to sickness fund members.  In 
ambulatory care, it is also possible to exclude treatments for which there is 
insufficient evidence, so the barrier for exclusion is somewhat lower than for 
hospital services.  A third set of rules applies to pharmaceuticals.  In principle, 
sickness fund members have access to all pharmaceuticals that have received 
market authorisation, which for cancer drugs now rests with the European 
Medicines Agency (EMA).  Within one year, the GBA, through IQWiG, appraises the 
evidence of effectiveness of the drug compared to other treatment options, usually 
based on a dossier provided by the manufacturer.  If the new drug is equally or less 
effective than existing treatment it will be priced according to the reference price 
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established for existing products; if the drug is more effective, sickness funds will 
collectively negotiate the price with the manufacturer.  Guidelines for ‘off-label use’ 
are provided by an expert committee hosted by the Ministry of Health (GBA 2016).  
In addition, a decision by the Federal Social Court stipulates that drugs that are 
used ‘off-label’ have to be funded by sickness funds if there is no alternative 
treatment, they are used to treat a condition that is life-threatening or permanently 
reducing the patient’s quality of life and if ‘the available data give rise to the 
prospect that the compound concerned will be successful in treating [the patient] 
(curatively or palliatively)’ (B 1 KR 37/00 R).  In all sectors, health technology 
assessment currently focuses on evidence of effectiveness, with preference given to 
evidence from randomised controlled trials (RCTs) and other controlled designs if 
RCTs are not available.  While cost implications for sickness funds are considered, 
cost-effectiveness analysis is not routinely undertaken as the GBA has not been 
given the legal mandate to conduct such analysis (in fact this option was removed 
in 2010), with the exception of informing arbitration procedures of novel drugs in 
cases in which manufacturers and sickness funds cannot agree on a price.   
Constitutional law can also be mobilised to impact on access to treatment 
decisions.  In cases of cancer treatment, courts frequently draw on the 
constitutional ‘right to life and physical integrity’, which in legal practice is 
interpreted to encompass a right to health and health care.  In 2005, a year after 
the GBA was established, the Constitutional Court reaffirmed the relevance of 
Article 2 in a landmark decision on the access to treatment in cases of life-
threatening illness.  The ‘Nikolaus decision’ stipulates that sickness funds cannot 
withhold funding for treatment if a patient suffers from a life-threatening illness 
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(lebensbedrohliche oder regelmäßig tödliche Erkrankung).  Invoking this right 
requires that no alternative treatment is available that conforms to the ‘current 
state of medical knowledge’ and that the treatment has a ‘not entirely remote 
prospect of curing or noticeably improving the condition’ (eine nicht ganz entfernt 
liegende Aussicht auf Heilung oder eine spürbare Einwirkung auf den 
Krankheitsverlauf) (1 BvR 347/98).  This was later specified by the Federal Social 
Court to mean that ‘the more serious an illness and the ‘more hopeless’ a situation 
is, the lower are the requirements of ‘serious indications’ of a not entirely remote 
prospect of improvement’ (BSG B1 KR 7/05 R). 
This application of the ‘right to health’ significantly lowers the threshold of 
evidence of effectiveness in legal decisions relating to life-threatening illness, 
resulting in tensions with the definition used in health technology assessments 
whose use is also anchored in legislation.  However, the Constitutional Court 
explains that the use of the constitutional right to health is also linked to the 
principle of the welfare state (Sozialstaatsprinzip), also embedded in the Basic Law 
(Article 20).  Here the Court argues that if the state forces its citizens to take out 
mandatory social health insurance, it has a duty to protect them in cases of severe 
illness (1 BvR 347/98).  
The German legal literature emphasises the inconsistencies within the legal 
framework resulting from the decision of the Constitutional Court and the practical 
challenge of operationalising the decision both for the GBA and in court (Welti 
2007; Francke and Hart 2006).  This specifically applies to the difficulty of 
interpreting the phrase used by the court to describe the level of evidence 
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necessary in support of a case (a ‘not entirely remote prospect’).  Nevertheless, this 
ruling has since informed a large number of social court decisions.  While these 
decisions only apply to the individual cases brought to court (i.e. they do not extend 
access to treatment to a wider group of patients), the ‘Nikolaus’ criteria havealso 
led to amendments to SGB 5 and the GBA’s rules of procedure to include new rules 
relating to the treatment of ‘life threatening illness’.  
 
Examples of legal challenges relating to access to treatment 
Case studies for this analysis were selected to represent a spectrum of legal 
decisions on access to health care.  Cancer was selected as a condition that is 
typically life-threatening and cases are therefore likely to reference the ‘Nikolaus 
decision’.  As social health insurance provides coverage for (almost) all new cancer 
drugs that have received market authorisation, court cases selected cover 
treatments that had either not been licensed for a condition (Avastin, used for 
treating glioblastoma, a type of brain cancer) or had not been approved by the GBA 
(induced hyperthermia, brachytherapy).   
Court decisions were identified through an online database that brings together all 
court decisions that refer to the ‘Nikolaus decision’, developed by a research team 
at the Institute for Social and Health Law at the Ruhr-University-Bochum 
(www.nikolaus-beschluss.de).  Search terms used were ‘Avastin’, ‘Hyperthermie’ 
and ‘Brachytherapie’ and decisions identified were taken between December 2005 
and December 2015.  Full texts of court decisions were available on the internet for 
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all federal court decisions and almost all state social court decisions (except three).  
District court decisions tended not to be available on the internet, with only 7 out 
of 23 decisions available online.  In total, full texts of 42 decisions were retrieved, of 
which two refer to decisions taken by the Federal Social Court, 27 by state social 
courts, and 7 by district social courts.  As social courts operate hierarchically, all 
decisions at state or federal level had previously been considered by district courts.  
Four full-text decisions relate to Avastin, 23 to induced hyperthermia and 6 to 
brachytherapy.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Avastin 
Avastin is the trade name of a cancer drug produced by the pharmaceutical 
manufacturer Roche. Its active ingredient is Bavicizumab, an angiogenesis inhibitor 
that slows the growth of new blood vessels.  Avastin first received European market 
authorisation in February 2004 for use in metastatic colorectal cancer in 
combination with 5-fluorouracil-based therapy as second-line treatment.  It has 
since received market authorisation for treatment in several types of cancer 
including renal cell cancer (2007), non-small cell lung cancer (2007), untreated 
central nervous system (brain) metastases (2009), metastatic breast cancer (2009), 
advanced epithelial ovarian, fallopian tube, or primary peritoneal cancer (2011), 
adjuvant colon cell carcinoma (2012) and metastatic carcinoma of the cervix (2015).  
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In addition, the EMA considered Avastin for glioblastoma in combination with two 
chemotherapies in 2010 and 2014, and both times did not grant market 
authorisation as studies suggest that the drug is not effective to treat this particular 
type of cancer (EMA 2014).  
Five court decision were identified in which a decision by a sickness fund not to 
fund Avastin for the treatment of cancer was challenged by patients, leading to four 
positive decisions (i.e. in favour of the patient) and one negative decision.   
 
Induced hyperthermia 
Induced hyperthermia is based on exposing parts of the body or the entire body to 
temperatures above the normal body temperature with the aim to accelerate, and 
improve the chances of, healing. Induced hyperthermia is used as a stand-alone 
treatment but is typically applied in combination with radiotherapy or 
chemotherapy. Two Cochraine Reviews (from the same team) concluded that the 
use of hyperthermia in combination with radiotherapy for the treatment of 
advanced rectal cancer and locally advanced cervix carcinoma had a measurable 
additional effect, but that the evidence is insufficient to draw firm conclusions (De 
Haas-Koch et al. 2009; Lutgens et al. 2010).  The GBA decided in 2005 to exclude 
induced hyperthermia as a service in ambulatory settings noting that there is no 
valid evidence of effectiveness (GBA 2005).  However, the treatment is offered in 
some hospitals, including some university hospitals (e.g. University Hospital Munich 
(2017)).  In addition, methods of application, temperatures and technologies vary 
which makes it difficult to compare outcomes as there is no set standard.   
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Thirty-five court decisions were identified relating to induced hyperthermia, of 
which 11 led to positive and 23 to negative decision outcomes.  One court decision 
was neither positive nor negative, but commented on a matter of procedure (1 BvR 
2496/07).  Most decisions related to advanced cancers (pancreas, breast, prostate, 
colon, soft tissue of the pelvis, liver, ovaries, brain, urinary tract cancer, and cancer 
of unknown origin).   
A large majority of decisions (n=24) dealt with induced hyperthermia for the 
treatment of cancers that courts considered life threatening.  In 14 cases, courts 
ruled that alternative treatment was available under social health insurance, thus 
violting the second criterion of the ‘Nikolaus decision’, leading to courts deciding 
against the wish of the patient for reimbursement.   
 
Brachytherapy 
Brachytherapy is a type of radiotherapy in which a source of radiation is placed 
inside or next to the area requiring treatment.  For prostate cancer, small 
radioactive rods (‘seeds’) are implanted directly into the tumour and stay there 
permanently without the need for removal.  The treatment requires approval by 
the GBA if provided in ambulatory settings.  The GBA commissioned an evidence 
review from IQWiG in 2004 which concluded that there was insufficient evidence of 
effectiveness and the absence of harm to support reimbursement (IQWiG 2007).  In 
an unusual step at the time, the GBA decided in 2009 to commission a longitudinal 
study that compares different treatments for prostate cancer including 
Brachytherapy with permanent seeds (PREFERE) (GBA 2009).  The GBA has 
17 
therefore postponed its decision as to whether to include brachytherapy in 
ambulatory care to 2030 (GBA 2015).   
All cases identified in this study resulted in negative decisions (n=13) with courts 
concluding that prostate cancer, if non-metastatic and at an early stage, was not life 
threatening and several treatment alternatives were available to sickness fund 
patients (e.g. surgery, chemotherapy).  Courts did therefore not consider the 
question of effectiveness, as the first two criteria were not fulfilled.   
 
Analysis of court decisions 
The following section examines the arguments made in court decisions relating to 
the three types of treatment outlined above are made, organised along the three 
criteria stipulated in the ‘Nikolaus’ decision: (1) life threatening illness, (2) absence 
of alternatives, and (3) prospect of improvement (by reference to evidence of 
effectiveness).  
Life threatening illness 
To establish whether a condition was ‘life threatening’, courts typically relied on the 
diagnoses provided by treating physicians and the assessment of the Medical 
Service of the Sickness Funds (Medizinischer Dienst der Krankenkassen, MDK).  The 
MDK is a regionally organised service that advises sickness funds on the 
appropriateness of prescribed treatment, by drawing on relevant scientific studies.  
Courts did not classify all cases as ‘life-threatening’ despite the fact that they all 
constituted diagnoses of cancer.  More specifically, courts distinguished between 
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stages of cancer progression, with advanced stages of cancer, e.g. recurrent or 
metastatic tumours or tumours that were classified as highly malignant, typically 
seen as life-threatening.  Earlier stages of cancer, in contrast, were often not 
classified as ‘life threatening’, although this depended on the type of cancer (e.g. L 
5 KR 343/13; S 13 KR 383/13; L 2 KR 189/14).   
Cases in which Avastin or hyperthermia were requested included a high number of 
diagnoses of advanced cancer, leading to some of these cases being decided 
positively (provided the two other criteria were met), while cases in which funding 
for brachytherapy was requested mostly involved early stage, non-metastatic 
prostate cancer that were not regarded as life-threatening.  One case was rejected 
because the claimant had not provided the information required to establish her 
state of illness (L 5 KR 2013/15 B ER).   
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Absence of alternatives 
Courts also considered the existence of alternatives available to patients to the 
treatments requested and they mostly relied on MDK assessments to underpin 
their decisions.  Court decisions show substantial variation in this respect, with 
courts applying different definitions of ‘alternative’.  In one case, a patient who 
requested Avastin had already received other types of treatment which had not 
been effective and was therefore not classified as an available alternative (L 5 KR 
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343/13).  In another case, the court followed the argument of a claimant that a 
potential alternative treatment was not suitable because of a high risk of severe 
side effects (S 13 KR 383/13).  Other courts reasoned in similar ways that the risk of 
severe side effects precluded possible alternatives (e.g. S 9 KR 29/15 ER), but others 
rejected this argument (e.g. L 5 KR 4/11).  
In most cases in which hyperthermia was requested, courts considered alternatives 
as available (n=14).  In a few cases in which courts came to a positive decision, 
alternatives were considered absent either because other treatment options had 
been exhausted (e.g. L 1 KR 21/13; S 8 7849/09) or because standard treatment was 
seen as inappropriate due to potential side-effects (S 9 KR 29/15 ER; S 1 KR 410/13; 
L 4 KR 206/11 B ER).  In one case, a court argued that a potential additional benefit 
of hyperthermia compared to standard treatment (i.e. chemotherapy) only ‘cannot 
be ruled out’.  This was sufficient for the court to justify an injunction in favour of 
the patient (L 11 KR 473/12 B ER).   
All brachytherapy cases were rejected by courts.  In all cases, courts argued that 
suitable alternative treatment was available as standard and funded by sickness 
funds (e.g. surgery, chemotherapy).  Courts reasoned that claimants desired 
funding for brachytherapy primarily because they considered the treatment as less 
invasive (e.g. than prostatectomy).  In two cases, courts decided that established 
alternatives were acceptable in spite of their risk of side effects (L 6 KR 456/06, B 
1KR 12/05 R).  One court referred to the existence of clinical guidelines as evidence 
of alternative treatment options (L 1 KR 132/12).  
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Prospect of improvement 
Courts considered various types of evidence to decide whether the treatments 
requested had a sufficiently strong prospect of improving the claimants’ conditions 
to qualify for reimbursement.  In line with the Constitutional Court’s ‘Nikolaus 
decision’, courts often accepted ‘indications’ of ‘potential’ effectiveness that were 
considerably weaker than those based on EBM established in regulatory practice 
(e.g. GBA, EMA).   
The courts approved requests for Avastin for individuals with advanced cancer, 
even though the drug had not received market authorisation for these types of 
cancer.  In a twist of legal reasoning, courts decided that some cases did not qualify 
for ‘off-label use’, as they lacked sufficient evidence to support the evidence of 
effectiveness criterion, but still resulted in positive decisions when the criteria of 
the ‘Nikolaus decision’ were taken into account (L 5 KR 343/13).   
Courts argued that results from ‘exploratory trials’ (i.e. phase II trials instead of 
phase III trials) were sufficient so demonstrate that treatment was ‘promising’.  A 
court considering Avastin for the treatment of anaplastic astrocytoma also came to 
a positive verdict arguing that ‘promising results’ of a phase II trial in combination 
with the recommendation from the treating clinical team provided a sufficiently 
convincing prospect of improvement (S 13 KR 383/13).   
In a similar vein, courts that came to a positive verdict on funding hyperthermia 
typically applied a low threshold of evidentiary support.  In two cases, courts 
argued that a previously positive experience of the claimant proved that the 
treatment was effective in the patient (S 9 KR 29/15 ER; L 1 KR 21/13).  Some courts 
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also regarded the existence of phase II trials as sufficient to conclude that an 
additional benefit ‘cannot be ruled out’ (L 11 KR 473/12 B ER).  This line of 
reasoning was taken by several courts (L 1 B 506/08 KR ER; S 12 KR 413/07 ER).  In 
these cases, courts argued that the more severe the condition the fewer 
‘indications’ of treatment effectiveness were required, following an earlier decision 
by the Federal Social Court (B 1 KR 4/13 R).   
In contrast, in other cases, courts argued that there was insufficient evidence to 
suggest a positive effect (L 16 KR 677/15 B ER; L 5 KR 2013/15 B ER).  In some of 
these cases, courts noted that the treatment could only be used as a palliative 
option (e.g. hyperthermia) as there was no evidence to suggest that the treatment 
would improve the patient’s condition, but there were other alternatives available 
for this purpose (L 5 KR 4/11).  Some courts noted that recommendations from the 
treating physician or other experts were sufficient to establish evidence of 
effectiveness (L 4 KR 206/11).  Yet another court argued that effectiveness could 
not be based on expert opinion alone if there were no study demonstrating 
effectiveness (L 5 KR 2013/15 B ER).  
For brachytherapy, treatment effectiveness was typically not discussed in detail as 
courts determined that the condition was not life-threatening and alternative 
treatment options were available.  However, several courts acknowledged that the 
GBA had not approved brachytherapy for reimbursement because of a lack of 
evidence of effectiveness.   
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Discussion and conclusion 
The case of Germany is interesting as legal reasoning based on the principle of a 
constitutional ‘right to health’ significantly differs from other countries discussed in 
the international literature. It differs from countries such as Colombia in that it uses 
a criteria based approach to applying the ‘right to health’ (in conjunction with the 
constitutionally enshrined principle of the welfare state) limiting its application to 
cases of life-threatening illness for which there is no publicly funded treatment 
available. This perhaps explains the much smaller number of cases in Germany than 
in Colombia (as of mid-2017, the database of the Nikolaus-Project listed 431 cases 
to which the ‘Nikolaus’ criteria were applied, of which 88 resulted in a positive 
decision). It also stands apart from jurisdictions in which the ‘right to health’ is 
either non-existent as a substantive social right (the UK) or is tempered by 
considerations of budget constraints, which means that decision-making is 
delegated back to governments or its agencies (or a public hospital as in the case of 
South Africa).  
This analysis also shows that there are substantial tensions between the two sets of 
norms derived from EBM that underpins health technology assessment and the 
constitutional right to health as it is applied in Germany.  While reference to the 
right to health does not automatically lead to access being granted to all  
treatments requested, the ‘Nikolaus decision’ of the Constitutional Court has 
reduced the threshold of evidence required for the reimbursement of treatment in 
cases of life-threatening illness.  
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The first criterion explicitly applies the right to health, which is derived from a 
constitutional right to life and physical integrity, by giving priority to individuals 
with life-threatening illness over considerations of HTA-based treatment decisions.  
This decision mirrors discussions about end of life treatment in other countries. It 
also resonates with the argument made in the literature that courts consider 
impacts on individuals rather than impacts on society.  In the extreme, it implies 
that any cost is acceptable to extend a single life, although the same money could 
be used to benefit other groups, for example by investing in prevention of risk 
factors or the treatment of chronic illness that helps avoid life-threatening illness in 
the long term (e.g. diabetes) (Syrett 2014; Lehmann 2006).  However, given the 
relatively small number of cases  one could argue that the accumulated cost 
implication does not threaten the sustainability of the German system of social 
health insurance in the same way as it does in countries with a high number of 
litigants (especially as it currently runs a substantial surplus).  However, no data are 
available on the aggregated costs of these decisions so its financial impact cannot 
be established with certainty.  This finding is a reminder of the unsolved problem of 
defining and operationalising ‘Wirtschaftlichkeit’ as a criterion for treatment 
decisions (Huster 2013).  As has been discussed elsewhere (Cookson and Dolan 
2000), giving priority to groups of patients always comes at a cost as it puts those at 
a disadvantage who are not prioritised. In the case of cancer diagnostics, some may 
only be a step away from having a life-threatening illness (e.g. not having a 
diagnosis confirming metastasis).   
The second criterion, the absence of alternatives, requires courts to define what is 
considered an acceptable alternative.  This analysis suggests that situations in which 
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patients have received a range of treatments that did not have the desired effect 
and in which alternatives were available but were considered unacceptable 
because of the risk of side effects were classified as ‘without alternative’.  This 
points to the problem of having to determine when curative efforts should be 
ended and replaced by palliative care and the extent to which these decisions 
should be taken by the patient, the medical professionals involved, the regulator or 
by courts. In many cases analysed here the patient died before the court came to a 
decision (except those that were made as injunctions), typically despite having 
received the treatment (as cases dealt with reimbursement not access per se) 
serving as a potent reminder that having additional treatment does not necessarily 
improve the odds of survival.  
The third criterion, arguably, is the most problematic. The Constitutional Court 
stipulated that there should be a ‘not entirely remote prospect of improvement’, 
which significantly softens the requirement of evidence of effectiveness applied in 
regulatory practice.  In some cases, the application of this interpretation is in direct 
conflict with EBM.  For example, some courts argue that the observation that a 
patient has responded well to treatment proves that the treatment was effective; 
however, in clinical research, causality cannot be derived from a single observation 
(i.e. the observed effect could be caused by other factors).  
In other cases, courts saw the existence of ‘promising’ phase II trial results as 
sufficient to indicate that the treatment could be beneficial, despite the fact that 
the drug had not received market authorisation for the condition in question.  This 
is problematic as market authorisation considers evidence of effectiveness as well 
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as of harm, with the latter not being considered by the courts.  In other cases, 
courts relied on medical professionals to assess whether the treatment was 
appropriate, ignoring the possibility that professionals might also be motivated by 
factors that are not necessarily in the patient’s best interest (e.g. scientific curiosity 
or more obvious forms of conflict of interest such as commercial opportunities).  
Importantly, courts seem to be unable to distinguish between treatment for which 
there is insufficient evidence of effectiveness and treatment that is proven to be 
ineffective (e.g. Avastin for glioblastoma; induced hyperthermia for the treatment 
of tumours).  While these are difficult decisions also for regulatory agencies, both 
those involved in market authorisation and in making decisions about public 
funding, courts have to rely on a rather blunt set of tools to inform these decisions.   
In addition, courts rely heavily on the MDK, to underpin their decisions as to 
whether a condition is life-threatening and whether treatment alternatives are 
available.  However, they seem less likely to follow MDK recommendations with 
regard to treatment effectiveness.  This dependence on medical expertise raises the 
question of competence of courts in making these decisions and while it can be 
argued that the MDK represents the interests of sickness funds it is not clear why in 
some cases priority is given to providers (i.e. treating physicians; a hospital cancer 
centre).  This is not to argue that courts are not competent to apply the law to 
these cases - they are - but there is a question as to whether they are best placed to 
make decisions about the benefits and harms of treatment given the difficulty of 
applying the criteria that qualify the application of the ‘right to health’ in German 
constitutional law. While this interpretation of the ‘right to health’ may result in 
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fresh hope to patients and their relatives who are understandably desperate in the 
face of terminal illness, this hope will be ill served if the treatment is not effective.  
It can be argued that, if society is willing to afford it, it is only humane to allow for 
additional treatment, even if the odds for improvement are slim. If concerns about 
the financial viability of individual rights are taken out of the equation, the 
argument for distributional justice becomes perhaps less pressing. Although some 
courts acknowledge that resources are finite in principle, this insight does not 
provide the grounds for courts to delegate decision-making about access to 
treatment to government or the self-administration.  However, this is somewhat at 
odds with the almost overwhelming sense of cost pressure almost everywhere in 
the health care system, if complaints about waiting times in ambulatory care and 
activity-based payments in hospital care are an indication.  The question is also 
whether, at societal level, this comes at a cost as this rationale, unwittingly or not, 
plays into an existing narrative that suggests that exclusions from social health 
insurance are unjust, insufficiently justified and essentially against the interest of 
patients.  . Certainly, it is not the responsibility of the courts to educate patients 
and the public about the necessity of regulating the access to treatment, but there 
is a cost to judicial intervention in treatment decisions including the monetary costs 
to the community of sickness fund members and the potential for false hope and 
harm to patients.  
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